Class Notes Winter 2009
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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN TRANSITION
Moving beyond neoconservatism
If foreign policy prescription can be judged by its results, neoconservatism, as the ideational basis for the foreign policy of George W. Bush, ought to be regarded as a huge failure, a disaster of historic proportions. By the time of President Bush’s departure from the White House, U.S. foreign policy was in disarray. The “war on terror” was inconclusive in Iraq and deteriorating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. America’s financial debt increased as its economy declined. Peace between Israelis and Palestinians looked as far away as ever. Above all, since 2001, the United States lost incalculably in terms of its reputation for responsible leadership, prestige, and legitimacy.
EXCEL SCHOLAR Matthew Goldstein ’11 assisted Ilan Peleg in research on the foreign policy of President George W. Bush.
If the United States is to restore its capacity to lead the world into a better future, nothing short of a new American grand strategy must be energetically implemented. At its center, this strategy ought to reflect an attitudinal prism vastly different from the neoconservatives’ nationalist, exceptionalist, unilateralist, and militaristic ideological framework. The new initiative ought to change American foreign policy in several fundamental ways. The following proposed elements ought to be part of the new American foreign policy:
- 1. Demilitarize American foreign policy. Rather then viewing the post-Cold War era as chaotic, dangerous, and threatening (as some Realist observers have done), or alternatively as opening an opportunity for the extensive and even unlimited use of American military power (as done by some of the neoconservatives), the end of the Cold War ought to be looked upon as a geopolitical blessing, a return from the edge of the nuclear abyss. This perspective, much more optimistic than that of either the hard-core Realists or the heavily ideological neoconservatives, means the possibility of genuine reduction in the level of militarization of American foreign policy—reduction in defense appropriations and military presence around the globe, and increasing reliance on economic and political instruments in international relations, rather than frequent and extensive deployment of military means. We need to reassure other actors in the international arena that the United States is not a revisionist power interested in wrecking the status quo, an impression left with many observers of Bush’s foreign policy.
The demilitarization of American foreign policy is not an endorsement of a pacifist philosophy, unilateral disarmament, or even reluctance to use military force when needed in well-defined and legitimate situations. The United States might continue to use its superior military power for such purposes as individual and collective self-defense (including terrorist acts short of war), action authorized by the United Nations to preserve the peace and security of all states, and genocide prevention. Moreover, the American military might continue to be important for certain deterrence purposes. Yet the United States needs to avoid clinging to the assumption that its military supremacy and new military technologies can solve most of its long-term foreign policy problems. The illusion of military force as a routine instrument of foreign policy ought to be abandoned. - 2. Reemphasize the diplomacy of consultation as an alternative to the unilateral use of force by the United States. The post-Bush era should facilitate the revitalization of the diplomacy of consultation as the dominant form of American leadership in the world. As a rule, multilateral efforts, alliances, and international institutions are preferable to unilateral military action. They offer the United States both worldwide political legitimacy and significant material resources in cases where action is needed.
For most of the post-World War II era, the United States found a way of heavily consulting, negotiating, and cooperating with other nations within the framework of multilateral alliances (e.g., NATO), special bilateral relations (e.g., the United Kingdom, Japan, Israel), extensive military and economic aid, and so forth. The use or threat of force, as recommended by the neoconservatives, was relatively rare, appropriately judged to be unpredictable, costly, and often unjust.
The United States should work now toward institutionalizing broader cooperation in the war on terrorists with the goal being the establishment of a full-fledged anti-terror regime. We need to focus on lowering the costs of defending ourselves against terrorist organizations by enhancing international cooperation. The United States should abandon the campaign against the United Nations carried out by some officials within the Bush administration, as well as the occasional tendency to ignore the international body altogether. In introducing a new balance into U.S. foreign policy, it is important to note that while the United Nations might not always be the appropriate place for carrying out an effective international action, it has the capacity of conferring legitimacy on a collective action by the international community. The Gulf War (1990-91) is a classic example. - 3. Work toward an era of globalism. The Bush administration’s neoconservative ideological framework was at its core nationalist, patriotic, and exceptionalist, although it made frequent use of high-minded ideals such as the spreading of democracy and freedom around the globe. A new ideological framework ought to rest on the assumption that all or most problems faced by humanity today are by their very nature global: terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uneven globalization and differential economic development, health issues and structural poverty, climate change and environmental degradation, and so forth.
Solutions for those problems ought to be found on a global level, internationally and multilaterally. Despite obvious difficulties, we ought to work toward a worldwide ideological consensus by codifying global norms. New international institutions capable of dealing with global issues might have to be established, and existing ones (e.g., NATO and the European Union) strengthened, but without accentuating the differences and widening the gaps between nations and groups of nations. The U.N. Security Council, for example, should be strengthened by adding several more permanent members (e.g., Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil) and a few more non-permanent members. - 4. Refocus American efforts on solving long-term, severe, “intractable” regional conflicts. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (especially Kosovo), Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Sudan (Darfur), and the Caucasus require intense international and particularly American attention. These conflicts have negative effects both domestically and internationally, producing resentment, generating violence and reprisals, and wasting human lives and economic resources. Special attention should be given to so-called failed states, which should typically be the collective responsibility of the international community. As a strategic choice, the United States should work toward the enhancement of self-reliance of various conflictual regions, following the successful European model.
- 5. Establish clearer prioritization of goals and pay careful attention to the allocation of resources for the achievement of those goals. A better sense of the “possible” is required in terms of American foreign and security policy. Neither the United States nor even a coalition of all Western countries has the capability of defeating every terrorist group or invading every country in which terrorists might find shelter. What is needed is a calibrated, calculated, and balanced set of objectives, a priority list, both in terms of dealing with global terrorism and in terms of the more general goals of American foreign policy. Nuclear terrorism is one of several important issues from which the investment in Iraq has diverted both attention and resources.
- 6. In a world shifting from clear-cut U.S. uni-polarity to what might be called “mixed-polar polyarchy,” an American policy of restraint and occasional balancing is preferred to the policy of primacy and frequent unilateral military action. An American policy of restraint (combined with a diplomacy of consultation and a commitment to a global agenda)—sometimes called a strategy of offshore balancing—is likely to be successful. Such policy would negate the policy of preemptive and preventive war announced with such fanfare by the previous administration. America’s great military and economic power, its naval power projection, its ability to create political coalitions to prevent the emergence of a Eurasian superstate, and its considerable soft power are among the factors working in favor of successful restraint rather than preemption/prevention.
Space limitations preclude elaboration of some additional, more general elements of a new strategy:
- Minimize the probability of disastrous self-fulfilling situations (such as Iraq 2003) by improving the decision-making process.
- Return to the pragmatic and largely non-ideological, moderate, and bipartisan Realism that has characterized American foreign policy in the past, instead of the ideological, confrontational policies of the neoconservatives.
- Deal effectively with the problem of American prominence; be aware that it is an invitation for the establishment of anti-American coalitions.
- Resist proposals for the establishment of closed, ideology-based international coalitions such as the “League of Democracies”; they are an invitation for a new and largely unnecessary Cold War.
If history is a reliable guide, particularly the history of the 20th century, then the transformation of American foreign policy today would give us a reason to be optimistic about the future.
